

AFRICA 18  
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This document contains \_\_\_\_\_ pages.

Number 3 of 10 copies, Series 1

SECRET

R S-SAW

EXCISE

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

OCT 29 1962 17815

FROM : AF - G. Kennen Williams

SUBJECT: African Government attitudes and reactions to U.S.  
Request interdict Soviet Bloc flights to Cuba via Africa.

The following summarizes African Government actions taken at U.S. request to preclude shipment of Soviet Bloc military equipment to Cuba via Africa.

1. African Countries which have signed air agreements with Soviet Bloc.

(a) Ghana

No report from Embassy as of noon October 28, 1962. Follow-up cable being dispatched.

(b) Guinea

"GCG has no intention grant Soviets landing or overflight rights to Cuba or Latin America."

In addition our Ambassador in Conakry has been granted authority by AID to finance purchase of jet fuel now scheduled for delivery to Conakry on basis GCG will positively not permit use for Bloc aviation purposes.

(c) Mali

GCM made no commitment in response our request beyond "agreeing to consider." However, GCM did point out that it had been many months since a Soviet overflight had been requested and no requests were now pending.

(d) Morocco

King has instructed Foreign Minister to make demarche with Russians to effect Morocco will not permit any arms shipment to transit Morocco by air. However, King will not permit U.S. technicians inspect any Soviet plane landing at Rabat-Sale.

(X) DECLASSIFY IN PART  
( ) DECLASSIFY  
FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY 23 OADR  
( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) G, OADR

SECRET

IL-18's

IL-14's cannot fly Rabat to Cuba or Rabat-Necife. Also, it is doubtful that TU-114's (requiring 10,200 foot runway for full load and maximum range) can use Rabat-Sale (8,000 feet) without reduced payload.

(e) Senegal

Issued orders prohibiting all Bloc flights to Cuba and Latin America.

(f) Sudan

GCS will deny any military or commercial bloc flight beyond Khartoum.

2. African countries with air agreement providing limited rights to Soviet Bloc

Niger

*by a simple exchange of letters*

While Niger has an agreement granting weekly overflight rights to Soviet Bloc, the GCS has assured the United States that Soviet overflights to Cuba will be denied.

3. African countries with no air agreement of any type with Soviet Bloc

(a) The following countries have given assurance to the United States that Soviet Bloc overflights or landings will be denied if requested:

Algeria, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Liberia, Libya, Somalia, Upper Volta.

(b) The following countries, while expressing interest in achieving a peaceful solution to the Cuban crisis, have as yet given no specific response to our requests for action preventing Soviet Bloc flights to Cuba:

Cameroon, Nigeria, Tunisia.

(c) Embassies

(c) Embassies in the following countries have not replied to Circular Cable 726 as of 1300 hours, October 28, 1962:

Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Sierra Leone, Gabon.

While the over-all actions noted in 1, 2, and 3 above appear to minimize possibilities of Soviet Bloc flights carrying military equipment to Cuba via Africa, the following situations bear close observation:

1. Illegal flights from Cairo or Khartoum over south-eastern tip of Libya or over Chad to Conakry, Dakar, Accra, Kano or Lagos.

2. Failure of Algeria, Guinea, Morocco or Senegal to abide by commitments to United States.

The African action plus Brazil's determination to inspect and Trinidad's denial of Soviet landings and overflights to Cuba restricts Soviets to the use of TU-114's since IL-18's would have to refuel at Recife and Trinidad.

It should also be kept in mind that long flights of TU-114's void of payload to Cuba may be expected to pick up Soviet technicians and return via Conakry, Dakar, and Rabat. Such return flights would probably be granted refueling rights by African countries.

In conclusion, I should like to call your attention to two important observations resulting from our current experience:

1. The favorable African response to our initiatives would have made Soviet air transport of atomic warheads difficult or impossible.

2. United States, along with its Allies, should affirmatively pre-empt or seriously limit Soviet air rights by a positive program of civil aviation. The Fitzgerald Plan should be favorably preacted.

Harbor:

AF:AF/;BAC:ib. :ms  
10/28/62

SECRET

**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

REVIEWED by MB DATE 3/7/68  
 ( ) RELEASE ( ) DECLASSIFY  
 (X) INDEX (X) DECLASSIFY in PART  
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 FOL, EO or PA exemptions 111

TS authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as \_\_\_\_\_, OADR  
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"GOC has no intention grant Soviets landing or overflight rights to Cuba or Latin America."

(c) Mali

GGM made no commitment in response our request beyond "agreeing to consider." However, GGM did point out that it had been many months since a Soviet overflight had been requested and no requests were now pending.

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10/28/62